Redress record
Ombudsman decisions and fraud rulings
The Financial Ombudsman Service is free and its decisions bind the firm. These are the patterns its scam and fraud decisions turn on, and the rulings and rule changes behind them. Descriptions of published outcomes only — we do not assess anyone's claim.
Decision patterns · 8 summarised · 3 landmark
UpheldTransfer (APP) fraudLandmark
Bank told customer to move money to a "safe account" — complaint upheld
- The question
- Should the bank have stopped a series of transfers made after a spoofed call from its own fraud number?
- What the ombudsman found
- The ombudsman found the payments were markedly out of character for the account and that the bank's on-screen warning was generic rather than tailored to the safe-account scam being described. The bank was directed to reimburse the payments with interest.
- Why it matters
- Generic warnings rarely count as effective warnings. Where a bank wants to rely on one, it must show it was specific to the scam type in front of the customer.
- Redress recorded
- Reimbursement plus 8% simple interest from the date of the payments.
Partly upheldInvestment
Clone firm bond: complaint partly upheld against the sending bank
- The question
- Where a customer paid a clone of an authorised bond provider, how far does the sending bank's duty to intervene go?
- What the ombudsman found
- The first payment carried enough hallmarks to require a human conversation; later payments did not add new red flags. The ombudsman split liability, finding the bank should have intervened at the first large transfer.
- Why it matters
- Liability can be shared. The point at which a bank should have paused matters more than the total amount lost.
- Redress recorded
- Partial reimbursement from the first payment onwards.
Not upheldCrypto
Crypto platform transfer: complaint not upheld
- The question
- Was the bank responsible for a loss where funds moved first to the customer's own crypto wallet?
- What the ombudsman found
- The ombudsman accepted the bank had questioned the payment, recorded the answers, and been given inaccurate information by the customer at the time. On the evidence, further intervention would not have changed the outcome.
- Why it matters
- What a customer told the bank during an intervention is central. Cases turn on the call recordings and the branch notes.
UpheldTransfer (APP) fraudLandmark
Conveyancing deposit sent to a hijacked email thread — upheld
- The question
- Should a first-time high-value payment to a new payee have triggered more than an automated confirmation-of-payee mismatch notice?
- What the ombudsman found
- The mismatch was displayed but not explained. The ombudsman found the bank's handling fell short of good industry practice for a payment of that size to a brand-new payee.
- Why it matters
- Confirmation of Payee mismatches are only useful if the customer is told what a mismatch means.
- Redress recorded
- Full reimbursement, plus £300 for distress and inconvenience.
UpheldImpersonation
Vulnerable customer, repeated cash withdrawals — upheld
- The question
- Where a customer with a recorded vulnerability made unusual counter withdrawals, what should staff have done?
- What the ombudsman found
- The ombudsman found the pattern should have prompted a supported conversation under the bank's own vulnerability policy, and that the exception the bank sought to rely on was applied too widely.
- Why it matters
- Vulnerability narrows the exceptions a firm can rely on, and it must be considered at the time, not after the complaint.
- Redress recorded
- Full reimbursement and compensation for distress.
UpheldPurchase scam
Marketplace purchase paid by transfer — upheld
- The question
- Is a payment for goods that never existed a scam claim or a private dispute?
- What the ombudsman found
- The ombudsman found no evidence the seller ever held the goods, and that the account receiving the money had been open for days. That made it a scam, not a civil dispute, and the claim fell inside the reimbursement rules.
- Why it matters
- The dispute-versus-scam line decides whether the reimbursement rules apply at all.
- Redress recorded
- Full reimbursement.
Partly upheldRomance fraudLandmark
Romance fraud across two providers — partly upheld
- The question
- Where payments ran through an e-money account before leaving the UK, which firm should have acted?
- What the ombudsman found
- Both firms had visibility of the pattern. The ombudsman found the receiving e-money firm had failed to act on clear mule indicators and apportioned redress between the two.
- Why it matters
- Receiving firms are increasingly on the hook. The reimbursement rules split the cost between sending and receiving banks.
- Redress recorded
- Redress apportioned between the sending bank and the e-money firm.
UpheldComplaint handling
Five-day decision deadline missed with no explanation — upheld
- The question
- What happens when a bank neither reimburses nor explains inside the required window?
- What the ombudsman found
- The ombudsman found the delay itself was a failing, ordered the claim reassessed on its merits, and awarded compensation for the handling.
- Why it matters
- Missing the deadline does not decide the claim, but it is a separate failing the ombudsman will address.
- Redress recorded
- Compensation for distress and inconvenience, claim remitted for reassessment.
Timeline · rulings and rule changes
· Rule change
Expanded fraud data sharing between banks
Firms broadened direct sharing of indicators on accounts receiving scam payments, aimed at closing mule accounts faster.
The practical test is how quickly a receiving account is frozen after the first report.
UK Finance· Rule change
Ombudsman award limits uprated for the new year
The maximum award the Financial Ombudsman Service can require a firm to pay was uprated, with the limit applied according to when the act complained about took place.
The ceiling that applies to your complaint depends on the date of the event, not the date you complain.
Financial Ombudsman Service· Legislation
Failure to prevent fraud offence in force
Large organisations became liable where an associated person commits fraud for their benefit and reasonable prevention procedures were not in place.
It shifts attention onto the firms whose systems fraud passes through, not only the individuals running it.
GOV.UK· Rule change
Mandatory APP fraud reimbursement begins
Reimbursement for authorised push payment fraud on Faster Payments became mandatory, with cost shared 50:50 between sending and receiving firms and a decision expected within five business days.
Reimbursement stopped depending on which bank you happened to use. Sending banks now carry a hard deadline.
Payment Systems Regulator· Legislation
Online Safety Act includes fraudulent advertising duties
Large platforms and search services were given duties to prevent and remove fraudulent paid advertising.
Most investment scams reach victims through paid adverts, so enforcement here matters more than any consumer checklist.
GOV.UK· Rule change
Consumer Duty takes effect
Firms became subject to a duty to deliver good outcomes for retail customers, including in communications, support and complaint handling.
It gives complaints about poor warnings, obstructive support and confusing letters a clearer regulatory hook.
FCA· Court ruling
Supreme Court rules in Philipp v Barclays
The court held that a bank's duty to execute a customer's clear payment instruction is not displaced by a general duty to protect them from APP fraud, narrowing the so-called Quincecare route for authorised payments.
The case pushed redress for transfer scams away from the courts and towards regulation and the ombudsman.
UK Supreme Court· Rule change
Confirmation of Payee rolled out
Banks began checking the payee name against the account before a transfer, showing a match, close-match or mismatch warning.
A mismatch is a genuine signal — but it only helps if the warning explains what it means.
Pay.UK· Rule change
Contingent Reimbursement Model Code launched
A voluntary industry code set expectations for reimbursing victims of authorised push payment fraud, signed by some but not all banks.
Reimbursement depended on which bank you used, which is precisely why the voluntary code was eventually replaced.
Lending Standards Board